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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Moving towards a single
contract? Pros, cons and mixed
feelings
Bien que peu prisé des syndicats de salariés et des représentants patronaux, le
contrat unique reste paradoxalement au cœur du débat public. Si le contrat
unique semble à première vue être une réponse séduisante pour réduire le
dualisme, il ne règle pas pour autant les problèmes liés à la précarité et à l’impact
de la protection de l’emploi ; ceux-ci peuvent être traités par des politiques
alternatives ciblées plus efficaces. De plus, bien que réels, les coûts du dualisme
sont moins évidents et moins bien démontrés que ceux engendrés par la
protection de l’emploi elle-même. Enfin, la suppression des CDD entrainerait, à
protection inchangée, une perte d’emploi importante car tous ces emplois ne
seraient pas remplacés par des CDI compte tenu de la prudence à l’embauche des
entreprises. Un assouplissement fort de la protection de l’emploi du nouveau
contrat unique serait alors nécessaire. Mais celui-ci peut intervenir dans le cadre
existant et n’a pas de raison d’être lié à un nouveau contrat : d’autres
contreparties en termes d’assurance-chômage ou de formation professionnelle
sont possibles.
Although the single employment contract is not popular among both
representatives of workers and company leaders, the proposal for a single labor
contract, created with the goal of reducing dualism, has paradoxically remained
at the forefront of debates on the need for reform of the labor market. At first
glance, the single employment contract seems to be an attractive response to the
issue of dualism. However, upon looking more closely, it appears that a single
contract would not resolve problems linked to precariousness and the
consequences of employment protection. Most of the time, alternative policies
could be more efficient. Moreover, while there are costs to dualism, these are not
as obvious and well established as the ones triggered by employment protection
itself. Finally, suppressing temporary contracts would lead, at a constant level of
employment protection, to important employment losses, given that not all
temporary jobs would become permanent jobs. A drastic reform of employment
protection would be needed. Such a reform does not need to be linked to the
creation of a new employment contract: counterparts in terms of unemployment
insurance or firm-sponsored training are possible.
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1/ An overview of the actual situation in Europe
In Europe, dualism is pervasive: it mainly affects young people under temporary
contracts and has led governments to initiate several labor market reforms. Some countries
such as France, Germany and Spain focused their efforts on limiting the use of fixed-term
contracts whereas countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy, Denmark and Finland have
moved towards flexible employment protection regulations. Are these regulations really
efficient in increasing the share of permanent contracts? Statistics suggest otherwise.
Between 1985 and 2008, European countries (excepted Denmark) experienced an increase
[1] This brief is a summary of
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in the share of temporary contracts (12% on
average in OECD countries). It is particularly high
in Spain (24.9% in 2010, Eurostat) and in the
Netherlands (18.5% in 2010, Eurostat), both
countries where employment protection for
regular contracts is high.
In order to reduce the negative
consequences of dualism, exacerbated by a
context of economic crisis and high
unemployment, several policy experiments have
been conducted with mixed results.
• In August 2005, the French government
created the “Contrat Nouvelle Embauche” (CNE)
for companies of less than 20 workers, a contract
with a 2-year probation period. The French
government tried to extend this contract to all
companies for workers below the age of 26
(CPE). However, both reforms were overturned:
the CNE for legal reasons (it was deemed
contrary to International Termination of
Employment Convention n°158) and the CPE
after protests by employees’ unions in March
2006.
• In February 2012, the Italian
government launched a comprehensive reform to
simplify its labor code: first, the forty different
types of employment contracts were brought
down to eight. A new contract with a
probationary period of three years replaced the
permanent one. Following these three years,
employers were required to hire workers
permanently. However, a large part of these
modifications were abandoned during the
ratification of the bill in July of 2012.
• In Spain, in March 2012, the
government also proposed a drastic reform of its
labor market, which mostly consisted in the
introduction of a new open-ended contract for
small companies (less than 50 workers) with a
probationary period of one year. This reform
gave tax breaks to employers who used this
contract to hire workers below the age of 30 or
that had faced a long-term unemployment period.
It also clarified the notion of “termination for
economic reasons” and limited the duration of
temporary contracts to 24 months.
Among the proposals to increase
flexibility and reduce dualism which arose through
public debate, the single labor contract is one of
the most popular. However, there are different
ways to move towards such a contract. One,
supported by some French unions, would be to
remove all forms of temporary contracts. This
solution would result in the loss of a margin of
adjustment for firms. A second possibility would
involve replacing all existing contracts by a unique
single contract that would be somewhere in
between the traditional permanent contract and
the fixed term contract. This contract, more
flexible than the current permanent one, could
have an extended trial period or be subject to less
dismissal requirements. Cahuc and Kramarz
(2004) have notably proposed to remove all the
collective regulations on layoffs and replace them
with a termination tax. Generally speaking there
are two forms of single employment contracts:
contracts with Progressive Seniority Rights or
contracts with Long Probationary Periods, and
any combination of these two logics is possible.
Changing the labor market in order to implement
this type of single employment contracts requires
a lot of work. The question we raise is whether it
is really worth the trouble.
2/ Would the single contract reduce
inequalities between workers?
The single employment contract is
presented as a tool to reduce inequalities between
workers caused by dualism in contracts. It also
gives employers (but also landlords and banks)
means to legally discriminate between different
groups of workers based on demographics or
skills. In particular, whereas workers under
permanent contracts are highly protected in case
of dismissals and therefore, can develop stable
working habits, temporary workers face job
insecurity.
Cahuc and Kramarz (2004) argue that
permanent workers are much more likely to be
home owners because they benefit from an easier
access to credit. Banks are less willing to grant
loans to temporary workers, viewed as
economically unstable. This makes it more
difficult for them to purchase a house. More
specifically they show that workers above the age
of 30 in a permanent contract are 10 to 15
percentage points more likely to become home
owners than workers in a temporary contract.
However, in this context, introducing a single
contract with a long probationary period is likely
to be inefficient: workers in the probationary
period would still be discriminated against by
banks and the gap between workers would
remain. Moreover, alternative reforms such as a
partial deregulation of the housing market may be
more effective.
Another consequence of the gap between
temporary and permanent workers is the
inequality in the access to training. Firms invest in
training if it provides workers with skills that are
profitable to them: hence, permanent workers are
more likely to receive training than others. Yet
again, a single contract with a long probationary
period is unlikely to improve the current situation.
The effects of a single contract with less dismissal
requirements might be positive but have yet to be
proven. However, more efficient solutions do exist.
For instance, Lemoine and Wasmer (2010)[2],
proposed to introduce specific Pigouvian
incentives for French firms by reducing their taxes
or layoff costs depending on whether they train
more or fewer workers, with more general training
to internalize the externality created by general
training, following upon the logic of Blanchard
and Tirole of an experience rating system[3].
Due to the difficulty for employers to
dismiss their workers under a regular contract, they
use temporary contracts as a screening device.
However, temporary workers whose contracts have
not been renewed are not necessarily presumed to
be less motivated or less skillful since a bad
economic situation could have made companies
fearful of offering regular contracts. Instead, the
termination of a worker under a Contract with
Progressive Seniority Rights or with Long
Probationary Periods, would serve as a much better
signal on the worker: the termination of such a
contract would necessarily be due to the workers’
lack of skill or motivation, not to the firms’
characteristics or to the formal impossibility to
renew the contract. Furthermore, there is a risk
that a single contract with a long probationary
period could reinforce abuse: probationary periods,
which are less regulated than the current temporary
contracts, could be used in the same way while
reducing the workers’ protection to workers, since
terminating a temporary contract is prohibitive in
most countries.
3/ The coexistence of permanent and
temporary contracts and the efficiency
of the labor market
The cost differeence in terms of employment
adjustement costs between temporary and
permanent contracts leads firms to use temporary
contracts as a cheaper adjustment variable to the
economic conjuncture: in periods of economic
booms, the high costs linked to permanent
contracts lead firms to use temporary contracts
(subject to weak regulations) to hire new
employees. In periods of crisis, the existing
regulations force firms to respond to economic
fluctuations through labor turnover instead of
using alternative methods such as changing the
workplace organization. This results in an excessive
turnover in the labor market (more hires in
temporary contracts but also more contract
terminations).
The model we built and quantified
confirms what analyze Bentolila et alii. (2010).
They find that the larger gap between the dismissal
costs of workers with permanent and temporary
contracts in Spain as compared to France is
responsible for the much higher unemployment
rate in Spain, as more temporary contracts to
expire.
There is considerable heterogeneity in the labor
market turnover rate even with a single labor
contract. Removing temporary contracts would
simply discourage firms to take risks by hiring new
workers. Figure 1 represents the employment effect
of varying layoff costs of regular contracts
denoted by F. The solid line is equal to total
employment under dualism (both permanent and
temporary employment). The dashed line gives the
level of employment in a world without temporary
workers. Starting (from the right) from a large level
of employment protection (say, F=0.06), the
employment rate (averaging up the first and second
employment period, which is interpreting the
model as reflecting an overlapping generation of
two-period firms) is approximately 76%.
Figure 2 (next page) further illustrate how changes
in firing costs affects hiring decisions and
termination of contracts. The green region is made
of two areas: the light green region represents the
number of workers initially hired as permanent
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Figure 1 : Impact of layoff costs for regular contracts
workers and retained by the firm;; while the dark
green region represents workers initially hired as
permanents workers but laid-off due to low
productivity. The blue striped region represents
workers hired under temporary contracts that will
eventually arrive to an expiration date without
incurring firing costs for the firm.
The model gives the following conclusions:
1. In this specific example, removing
temporary contracts leads to a 7 percentage point
drop in employment at a constant level of
employment protection for regular contracts.
2. Reducing employment protection raises
employment in both worlds;; it is faster in the
absence of temporary contracts.
3. Without temporary contracts, one can
restore the same level of employment as in the case
of coexistence of permanent and temporary
contract if layoffs costs in permanent contracts F
are drastically reduced, namely a third of their
initial value.
The essence of our argument is to focus more on
the costs of employment protection than on the
need to reduce dualism. In many countries, the
prerequisites of “economic layoffs” are not well
defined in the law and are thus a source of
uncertainty: in France, 70% of litigation cases
concern individual layoffs when in reality they are
the result of a bad economic situation. These
litigations often last more than one year.
Employment protection is paradoxical: countries
with the strongest employment protection are also
those where employees perceive their job to be the
less secure. Likewise, they are also those where
stress is the highest among workers: for permanent
workers, the risk of layoff is lower but can be
associated with adverse social consequences. Costly
economic layoffs lead firms to put more pressure
on their workers to increase productivity or to
obtain dismissals at lower costs. Employment
protection has in addition an ambiguous effect on
the allocation of productive units: on the one
hand, it can favor less productive structures and
slows the allocation process of workers on the
most productive activities. A vast literature has
shown that this results in distortive effects on
capital accumulation and in misallocation of
productive units leading to a lower productivity,
even if the overall marginal effect of employment
protection may sometimes be positive in low
protection countries such as in the United States.
4/ Conclusion
A large part of the debate on how to favor
employment and reduce dualism focuses on the
idea of implementing a single labor contract.
Advertising for labor market reforms through the
single labor contract label is a way to argue for the
convergence of different types of labor contracts
and the removal of temporary contracts which
appears as the least costly solution. But this focus
undermines alternative reforms which could be
more efficient in limiting the negative effects
caused by dualism. Moreover, advocates of this
proposal have conflicting views on the
characteristics of such a contract. The 'single labor
contract' is meant to be a quid pro quo (meaning an
exchange of something against something else,
understood by all parties). By single labor contract,
proponents of this measure probably mean
ambitious reforms of permanent contracts with
less protection. This part may however be a
quiproquo (a misunderstanding due to voluntary
ambiguity on the concepts) if this amounts to the
disappearance of temporary contracts in exchange
for an extended probationary period. It is hard to
believe that unions would favor this solution since
fixed duration contracts are fairly well protected
and would be replaced by contracts with long
probationary periods, or an increase of individual
layoffs even within permanent contracts.
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